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CASE COMMENTS
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CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE
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REQUIRED TO FULLY CONSIDER THE ENVIRONMENTAL

ADMINISTRATION

IS

IMPACT OF STATE PROJ-

ECTS BEFORE APPROVING "BLOcK" GRANTS UNDER THE SAFE STREETS ACT.-

The Green Springs area of Virginia is a unique rural community in that nearly

all of its homes were built during the nineteenth century and have been substantially maintained in their original condition. Attesting to the historical and
architectural significance of the homes, three have been placed on the National
Register for Historic Places' as provided in 16 U.S.C. § 470a(a) (1) of the
National Historic Preservation Act.2

During 1970, the Green Springs area became the proposed site of a reception and medical center for Virginia prisoners. Contrary to the community's
setting and architectural design, the facility would consist of four concrete-faced
buildings, a thirty-foot guard tower, and a surrounding prison-type fence. In
response to that action, suit was brought by area citizens, both as individuals
and members of an unincorporated association known as the Green Springs
Association, seeking to permanently enjoin the construction of the facility and

the allocation of federal funds for the project by the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration (hereinafter referred to as LEAA) . Richard W. Velde and
Clarence M. Coster, Associate Administrators of the LEAA, and Otis L. Brown,
Director of the Department of Welfare and Institutions for the State of Virginia

-the

agency responsible for the center-were named as defendants.
The Green Springs residents claimed that the administrators of the LEAA
and Otis L. Brown violated both the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966,

(hereinafter referred to as NHPA) and the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969' (hereinafter referred to as NEPA). It was further asserted that de-

fendant Brown deprived them of their ninth and fourteenth amendment rights
to an environment free from unnecessary environmental degradation. They base
these claims upon the fact that in choosing the Green Springs area and allocating $775,000.00 in the form of a "block" grant to the State of Virginia, the

responsible officials failed to take into account the project's environmental effect
as required by both statutes,' and failed to issue a detailed statement regarding
1 Boswell's Tavern was placed on the National Register in 1969. Hawkwood and Westland were placed on the Register in September, 1970. Ely v. Velde, 321 F. Supp. 1088, 1089
n.2 (E.D. Va. 1971).
2 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1970).
3 The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701-37 (1970), provides for the creation of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and authorizes the
Administration to make "block" grants to states after those states have submitted an approved
comprehensive plan for crime control and prevention. The state may then disperse the funds
in accordance with its comprehensive plan. See detailed analysis infra.
4 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1970).
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
6 Section 470f of the Historic Preservation Act requires:
The head of any Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over a proposed Federal or federally assisted undertaking in any state . . . shall, prior to the
approval of the expenditure of any Federal funds on the undertaking . .. take into
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the environmental impact as required by NEPA1 The district court rejected the
resident's contention and based its conclusion on the premise that NHPA and
NEPA were in irreconcilable conflict with the prevailing Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act' (hereinafter referred to as the Safe Streets Act) under
which the "block" grant in question was allocated.' The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, while refusing to apply NEPA and NHPA to the
state welfare agency, disagreed with the district court's construction of the applicable statutes and held: the LEAA, being a federal agency, must comply with
the mandates of both NEPA and NHPA before approving the expenditure of
substantial federal funds. Ely v. Velde, Civil No. 71-1351 (4th Cir., November
8, 1971).
Congress intended the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) to
protect sites and properties of statewide and local historical import and to generally promote interest in the preservation of all properties representing the culture and heritage of the nation."0 Coordination of preservation and improvement
efforts on the federal, state, and local levels' was accomplished in part by the
establishment of a National Advisory Council 2 and furthered by certain procedural mandates applicable to all federal agencies.
Unlike preceding antiquity acts which had no way of controlling the
impact of federal projects on historical sites,' 4 NHPA inaugurated the following
procedure. Section 470f states that heads of federal agencies which directly or
indirectly have jurisdiction over proposed federal or federally funded undertakings shall before expending any federal funds take the project's historical
effect into account and afford the Advisory Council a reasonable opportunity
to comment on the effect of such projects on sites included in the National
Register for Historic Places. This did not mean the Council could actually halt
or prevent federal projects endangering historical sites. Instead, the Council
was prescribed to act as nothing more than an advisor with the power to comment favorably or adversely on such federally funded projects. In so limiting
their capacity, Congress meant to leave sufficient room for so-called "progress."' 5
While attention was to be focused on historic sites and their significance, the
account the effect of the undertaking on any district, site, building, structure, or
object that is included in the National Register.
Section 4332 (C) (i) of the National Environmental Policy Act requires all agencies
of the Federal Government to:
• . . [I]nclude in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement . . . on(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action..

7
8
9

42 U.S.C. § 4332 (C) (i) (1970).
42 U.S.C. §§ 3701-37 (1970). See note 3 supra.
Ely v. Velde, 321 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Va. 1971).

10 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1970); H.R. REP. No. 1916, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); Note,
Public Historic Preservationin Texas, 49 TExAs L. REv. 267 (1971).
11 Prior to 1966, historic preservation statutes only extended to properties considered
"nationally" significant and took no cognizance of local or statewide sites of historical significance. See, e.g., The Antiquity Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. § 431; The Historic Sites Act of
1935, 16 U.S.C. § 461.
12 16 U.S.C. § 470 (i) (1970).
13 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1970).
14 See, e.g., The Historic Sites Act of 1935, 16 U.S.C. § 461.
15 H.R. REP. No. 1916, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1966); 112 CONG. REc. 25939 (1966)
(remarks of Representative Quillen).
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most that Congress desired was a balance between American heritage and new
construction.' Thus, they insisted upon strict procedural compliance by federal
agencies," but the required procedural steps were merely designed to elicit consideration and cognizance of historical factors in the decisionmaking stage. In
the final analysis, NHPA's general goal was to promote a high degree of cooperation and coordination in federal activities so that historical considerations would
not be ignored. 8
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) has a twofold purpose.
First, it broadly describes what the nation's environmental policy will be,'9 and
secondly, it imposes procedural duties on federal agencies to force their compliance with and implementation of that policy." Section 4331 of the Act declares
that it will be the federal government's continuing policy to "use all practicable
means" which are consistent with other national policy considerations to: 1) both
protect and restore environmental qualities including "esthetically and culturally
pleasing surroundings;" 2) preserve important "historic, cultural, and natural
aspects of our national heritage;" and 3) "maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of individual choice." The
legislation was designed to insure that federal projects and actions would not
unnecessarily contribute to the environmental problems faced by the nation.
Instead, the various federal agencies were to reorder their priorities and set the
pace for a nationwide program of environmental improvement.'
In order to coordinate this environmental initiative, the Act authorized the
creation of a Council on Environmental Quality.22 More importantly, NEPA
placed upon all federal agencies certain "action-forcing" procedural duties
16 H.R. REP. No. 1916, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1966).
17 Few cases have been premised on NHPA and judicial interpretation is nearly nonexistent. However, the few courts that have dealt with the Act have required strict compliance
with its procedural mandates. See, e.g., Berkson v. Morton, Civil No. 71-1085B (D.C. Md.,
October 1, 1971); South Hill Neighborhood Association v. Romney, 421 F.2d 454 (6th Cir.
1969) (dictum), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1025 (1970).
18 The Interior and Insular Affairs Committee's amendments to the original bill, S. 3035,
which went on to form part of the Act in its final form, indicate at one point a desire on their
part to expand the Advisory Council's purview and potential. The original language of § 470f
was amended so as to expand the number of federal agencies required to take historical factors
into account. Section 470f was also amended to allow the Council an adequate and reasonable time to comment on proposed federal action rather than the flat 60 days stated in the
original bill.
However, further amendments make it clear that the Council's authority was quite limited.
One reduced the Advisory Council's duties as outlined in § 470j in order that they conform
to its purpose-namely to perform advisory functions. A second omitted provision which
would have allowed the Advisory Council to hold hearings under oath; compel attendance,
testimony, or production of records; and exercise other powers not commonly granted an
advisory council. H.R. REP. No. 1916, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
19 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
20 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
21 Various acts in force prior to the National Environmental Policy Act declared that
environmental factors must be taken into account. See, e.g., Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 662 (a) (1970); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668aa (b) (1970).
However, none have expressed the broad congressional mandate for "action" that NEPA did.
See Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 230 (1970); Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 COLUm. L. REv. 612, 643-51
(1970); Note, An Analysis of Title I of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1
E.L.R. 50035 (1971); Note, A Panoramic View of the National Environmental Policy Act,
16 How.L.J. 116 (1970).
22 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1970).
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whose completion was mandatory to the initiation of any major federal action."5
Section 4332 requires "to the fullest extent possible" that the laws of the United
States as well as its policies and regulations "shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in [the] act." It goes on to state
that all federal agencies must use a "systematic, interdisciplinary approach" in
their decisionmaking which will guarantee proper environmental planning
where a proposed project might have an impact on man's environment.2 4 To
accomplish this, federal agencies are required to develop methods which will
insure consideration of environmental factors.2 5 They are additionally required
to:
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions" significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible
official on(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided....
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of longterm productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be2 7involved in the proposed action should it
be implemented.

By requiring execution of the above procedural steps, Congress meant to insure
full, good faith weighing of environmental factors into an "environmental cost/
national benefit" equation, and exploration of alternatives which might alter the
equation. Senator Jackson, author of the Act, enunciated this requirement of a
balancing judgment. He said on the Senate floor:
...

Subsection [4332 (B) is] ...

designed to insure that all relevant en-

23 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). In hearings before the Senate Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, "action-forcing" measures which would make NEPA "capable of implementation" were urged by Dr. Caldwell. Hearings on S. 1075 Before the Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 112-16 (1969). Immediately thereafter Senator Jackson
instructed the Interior Committee staff to draft additional provisions to the original bill in
order to place a mandatory responsibility "for the management of the human environment"
upon all federal agencies. Senator Jackson stated that this way "no agency will then be able
to maintain that it has no mandate or no requirement to consider the environmental consequences of its actions." Id. at 206. See S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969); 115
CONG. Rnc. 40416 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson); 115 CONG. REc. 39702-04 (1969)
(provisions of the Conference Substitute).
24 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (A) (1970).
25 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (B) (1970).
26 Since it would not be possible for federal agencies to prepare detailed statements for all
actions affecting the environment, § 4332 only requires statements when "legislative proposals"
or "major Federal action[s]" are involved. However, federal officials and agencies are still
required to consider the environmental impact of any decision and where § 4332 statements
are not required, the environmental effects must be made part of a reviewable record upon
which the agency based its ultimate decision. See Note, An Analysis of Title I of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1 E.L.R. 50035, 50038 (1971).
27 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1970).
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vironmental values and amenities are considered in the calculus of project
development and decisionmaking. Subsection [4332 (C)] establishes a
procedure designed to insure that . . . any adverse [environmental] effects

which cannot be avoided are justified by some other stated considerations of
28
national policy ....
The legislative history of NEPA makes it quite clear that despite the phrase
"to the fullest extent possible" Congress intended to impose on every federal
agency a mandatory duty to manage and protect the environment. The phrase
was not to be used as a means of avoiding strict compliance with § 4332, but
rather was inserted for the sole purpose of excepting agencies specifically precluded from doing so by statute or whose compliance was virtually impossible.2 9
Even these agencies were required to comply with the Act to a feasible degree
and submit reasons to the President by July 1, 1971 detailing why they could
not entirely conform."0
Executive and administrative guidelines for implementation of NEPA have
stressed the compulsive nature of the Act and have been strict and explicit in
regard to the procedural requirements contained therein.81 Nevertheless, the
early district court decisions were not entirely consistent in their interpretation of
the Act and especially in regard to § 4332.2 It should be noted, however, that
the majority of decisions denying relief under NEPA dealt with federal projects
initiated long before the Act went into effect on January 1, 1970." Hence, many
of the earlier cases are poor tests of the Act's utility.
The most extreme dilution of NEPA mandates was stated in the case of
Bucklein v. Volpe. 4 There the Act was ruled nothing more than a declaration of
congressional policy. In keeping with this philosophy, the court felt that NEPA
didn't seem to create any rights or impose any duties "of which a court can take
cognizance." The Bucklein view was ignored, however, by a clear majority of
courts who instead saw NEPA as a creator of judicially enforceable duties to be
performed by federal agencies. 5
28 115 CONG. REC. 29055 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson); accord, Council on
Environmental Quality Guidelines, 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971).
29 115 CONG. REc. 40417-18 (1969) ("Major Changes in S. 1075 as Passed by the
Senate"); 115 CONG. REC. 39702 (1969) (Conference Committee Report).
30 The Council on Environmental Quality interprets NEPA as binding upon all federal
agencies "unless existing law applicable to the agency's operations expressly prohibits or makes
compliance impossible." Council on Environmental Quality Guidelines, 36 Fed. Reg. 7724

(1971); accord, Exec. Order No. 11,514, 35 Fed. Reg. 4247 (1970).

31 Id.
32 Many decisions immediately following the enactment of NEPA failed to premise relief
upon the Act. E.g., Bucklein v. Volpe, Civil No. C-70 700 RFP (N.D. Cal., October 29, 1970);
Investment Syndicates, Inc. v. Richmond, 318 F. Supp. 1038 (D. Ore. 1970); Brooks v. Volpe,
319 F. Supp. 90 (W.D. Wash. 1970); Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett,
315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970); contra, Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Secretary of the Army,
315 F. Supp. 845 (S.D. Fla. 1970); Sierra Club v. Laird, Civil No. 70-78 TUC (D. Ariz.,
June 23, 1970); Texas Committee v. United States, Civil No. A-69-CA-119 (W.D. Tex.,
February 5, 1970); Wilderness Society v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970).
33 See, e.g., Brooks v. Volpe, 319 F. Supp. 90 (W.D. Wash. 1970), aff'd on merits, 329
F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Wash. 1971); Investment Syndicates, Inc. v. Richmond, 318 F. Supp.
1038 (D. Ore. 1970); Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp.
238 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
34 Civil No. C-70 700 RFP (N.D. Cal., October 29, 1970).
35 See, e.g., Coastal Petroleum v. Secretary of the Army, 315 F. Supp. 845 (S.D. Fla.
1970); Sierra Club v. Laird, Civil No. 70-78 TUC (D. Ariz., June 23, 1970); Texas Committee v. United States, Civil No. A-69-CA-119 (W.D. Tex., February 5, 1970); Wilderness
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Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United
States Army, 6 somewhat typified this later interpretation of the Act." In that
case, the Corps of Engineers failed to file what the court considered a sufficient
impact statement on the environmental effect of an earth embankment dam
across the Cossatot River in Arkansas. At the same time the action was brought
against the Corps, over two-thirds of the allocations for the project had already
been spent, but construction on the dam itself had not yet begun. Despite this
fact, the court in making its decision left no doubt that programs must be
structured from the outset in accordance with NEPA requirements. In addition,
undertakings must be upgraded to meet these requirements. The court cited the
Council on Environmental Quality's Interim Guidelines 8 and the legislative
history of NEPA 9 in determining that the language "to the fullest extent possible" included in the Act was not at all ambiguous and with few exceptions all
federal agencies were required to comply with the directives of § 4332. While the
court felt NEPA created no substantive rights so that the dam project could be
permanently enjoined, it did envision NEPA as an "environmental full disclosure act" requiring performance of certain procedural steps which allow the
ultimate decisionmakers to deliver informed rulings on proposed federal projects. 40
The Supreme Court has yet to deliver a majority opinion interpreting
NEPA specifically, 4 ' but it has explored the duties of agency administrators
in regard to other "environmentar" acts.
Justice Marshall, writing the majority opinion in Citizens to Protect Overton Park v. Volpe,42 took notice of the growing national concern with the environment which prompted the enactment of legislation "designed to curb the
accelerated destruction of our country's natural beauty." NEPA was cited as an
43
example.

The case centered around § 4 (f) of the Department of Transportation
Act of 19664 and § 138 of the Federal Aid to Highway Act of 19681s which
require the Secretary of Transportation to withhold federal funds for highways
going through public parks until he has determined that no "feasible and pruSociety v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970); Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir.
1970); contra, Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 328 F. Supp. 332 (D. N.M. 1971).
36 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
37 United States v. 247.37 Acres of Land, Civil No. 7769 (S.D. Ohio, September 9,
1971); accord, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United States

Army, 324 F. Supp. 878 (D.D.C. 1971); Gibson v. Ruckelshaus, Civil No. 5255 (E.D. Tex.,
March 1, 1971). See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401
(D.D.C. 1971); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission, Civil
Nos. 3566-8, 3568-3, 35688-9 (2nd Cir., October 22, 1971).
38 35 Fed. Reg. 7391 (1970).
39 115 CoNG. Ryc. 40416-17 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson); 115 CONG. REC.
40417 (1969) ("Major Changes in S.1075 as Passed by the Senate').
40 325 F. Supp. at 759.
41 Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Department, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 968 (1970) (Black, Brennan & Douglas, J.J., dissenting); The Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Schlesinger, Civil No. A-483 (U.S.,
November 6, 1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
42 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
43 Id. at 404 n.1.
44 49 U.S.C. § 1653 (f) (1970).
45 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970).
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dent" alternative route exists. Furthermore, if no other route is available, the
Secretary still cannot approve such funds unless there has been "all possible
planning to minimize harm" to the park.
In dealing with these acts, the Court prescribed a procedure to be used by
lower courts reviewing challenged discretionary administrative actions. De novo
review of such decisions was not desired or allowed, but rather a "substantial
inquiry" was required into whether the applicable standards of the Administrative Procedure Act46 had been met. Discretionary administrative actions were
to be vacated if they were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," and this was to be determined by a threepronged test. First, the action taken had to be within the administrator's authority. Second, it had to be based upon a consideration of relevant factors.
Third, it could not be clearly erroneous. The reviewing district courts were instructed to premise their answers to the three questions on a contemplation of
all the facts upon which the administrator made his decision. They could even
call the administrator as a witness if his formal findings were insufficient."
While Overton Park directly relates only to highways and parklands, it
seems to apply this procedure to the entire range of suits intended to halt environmentally destructive action by agency administrators." When dealing with
NEPA, the Fifth Circuit has interpreted the decision accordingly.49 After halting a federally funded project, it instructed the responsible administrator to file
a § 4332 (C) (i) impact statement and review the environmental effect of the
project as a whole. Once this was completed, the district court was to conduct
a full review based on the Overton Park guidelines.
Like most courts before it, the district court hearing the Ely case took notice
of the requirements contained in § 470f of NHPA and § 4332 (C) (i) of
NEPA and noted that "both . . . are designed to foster.., improvement and
maintenance of areas such as Green Springs." 5 However, it found difficulty in
reconciling the tenets of the Safe Streets Act.
The Safe Streets Act is considered the most comprehensive crime control
legislation ever enacted. 5' Its purpose is to provide federal financial assistance
to state and local law enforcement agencies so that the entire criminal justice
system might better cope with the nation's drastic increase in criminal activity.52
To implement this goal, the Act by design makes the state the focal point of
crime control as it has traditionally been. 3 It does so through the creation of
the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) which undertakes the
authorization of funds mostly in the form of "block" grants to states submitting
approved comprehensive plans. 4 42 U.S.C. § 3733 specifies that:
46
47
48
49
50

5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
401 U.S. at 415-21.
1 E.L.R. 10035 (1971).
Conservation Society v. Texas, Civil No. 30915 (5th Cir., August 5, 1971).
321 F. Supp. at 1092.

51

See Braun, Federal Government Enters War on Crime, 54 A.B.A.J. 1163 (1968).

52

H.R. REP. No. 488, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1968).
Id. at 3.
54 The LEAA retains control of 15% of the crime control funds to be allocated under
the Safe Streets Act. These funds may then be distributed on a "grant-in-aid" basis. 42 U.S.C.
§ 3736 (1970).
53
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The [LEAA] shall make ["block"] grants . .. to a State planning agency
if such agency has on file with the [LEAA] an approved comprehensive
state plan .. .which conforms to the purposes and requirements of this
chapter. [Emphasis added.J
This unprecedented "block" grant spending replaces traditional "grant-inaid" funding. The two differ in that under "grant-in-aid" spending, the disper-sing federal agency specifically approves each individual project and funds
that project only; whereas with "block" grant programs each state (in the case
of the Safe Streets Act through a criminal justice agency) presents a general plan
of composite projects to be undertaken by its local governmental entities and
upon approval the federal agency allots funds to the state in "block" form to
disperse as it sees fit based on that comprehensive plan." Thus, the LEAA
relinquishes traditional federal dictatorial powers over projects to be undertaken
and financed, and must instead allow states to determine their own priorities
with relatively no strings attached to federal funds." This according to Senator
Dirksen and other backers would prevent the feared establishment of a national
police force and would attack the local problem of law enforcement in a more
cogent manner.
Where a comprehensive state plan is unsatisfactory or non-existent, the7
LEAA can take control of all funds so as to guarantee compliance with the Act."
A further guarantee is embodied in § 3757 which allows the LEAA to discontinue
or withhold future payments or grants where the applying state substantially

fails to comply with the Act's provisions, or regulations and guidelines promulgated by the LEAA, or with the comprehensive plan which the state submitted.
By these means, Congress insured that funds would be wisely and effectively
used to increase state and local crime control.
In the instant case, the funds provided for the Green Springs Reception
and Medical Center were acquired through the "block" grant process described
55

The procedure for obtaining "block" grants under the Safe Streets Act may be sum-

marized as follows:
a) the Governor appoints a state criminal justice agency;

b) local law enforcement agencies propose enforcement and prevention plans to this

agency;
c) the agency then formulates a comprehensive plan for the state which it submits
to the LEAA for approval;
d) upon approval, the LEAA allocates funds to the state agency based on the state's
population;
e) the state agency may then allocate the funds according to its comprehensive plan,
with at least 75% of the funds required to go to local enforcement units or
combinations thereof.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701-37 (1970); H.R. Rp.No. 488, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1968); 114
CONG. Rnc. 14758 (Statement by Senator Thurmond).
56 The Congressional supporters of the "block" grant or "hands-off" provision (including
Dirksen, Scott, and others) did so for two main reasons. First, they feared federal control of
all law enforcement activities and the possibility of a national police force. Additionally, law
enforcement activities were considered a local problem to be controlled locally. Granting funds
to states for their distribution was felt to be the only way to guarantee an integrated and comprehensive effort in the area of crime control. 114 CONG. REc. 14753, 14909 (Statement by
Senator Dirksen); see also 113 CONG. REc. 21,083 (1967) (remarks of Representative Cellar);
113 CONG. REcO. 21,188 (1967) (remarks of Representative Hutchinson); 114 CONG. Rna.

14757 (1968) (remarks of Senator Thurmond); S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 227
(1968).

57

42 U.S.C. § 3735 (1970).
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above.58 In other words, the State Criminal Justice Agency of Virginia had filed

a comprehensive plan which was approved by the LEAA. The result was the
Administration's funding of a "block" grant in the amount of $775,000.00 of
which $275,000.00 was earmarked for the Green Springs project by the state.59
Defendant Brown made the site selection in his official capacity as Director

of the Department of Welfare and Institutions for the state of Virginia. While
he stated that other sites were available, he considered the Green Springs
area best due to its level ground, location, and proximity to major highways.6"

The LEAA in approving the state's comprehensive plan admittedly failed to
consider the environmental and historical import of the location and accordingly
failed to file a detailed statement on the environmental consequences of locating
the reception and medical center in Green Springs. In defense of this failure, the
LEAA claimed that under the "block" grant funding system incorporated by
the Safe Streets Act, the location of such facilities was entirely a local concern,
hence immaterial to the LEAA. Its position centers on certain sections of
that Act which it argues prohibit almost all interference with or control of
state use of "block" grants, and make the Safe Streets Act, NEPA, and NHPA
irreconcilable."'
The district court accepted the view taken by the LEAA and determined
that the three acts involved were in direct conflict. The court enumerated the
inconsistencies which it felt existed between them. It noted that NHPA requires
all federal agencies to submit plans to the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation prior to the approval of any federal funds for projects which might affect
structures included in the National Register. 2 Similarly, NEPA provides that
federal agencies shall "to the fullest extent possible" include in every recommendation or "other major Federal action significantly affecting the environment" a detailed environmental impact statement. 5 On the other hand, the
court concluded that the Safe Streets Act requires the LEAA to make "block"
grants over which it has no control to state planning agencies if such agencies have an approved comprehensive plan on file with the Administration."'
Considering these provisions incompatible, the court reasoned that the
Safe Streets Act must prevail for three major reasons.
First, it determined that .NEPA language, specifically the words "to the
fullest extent possible," made the Act discretionary, while the terms "[t]he Administration shall make grants" contained in the Safe Streets Act were non-discretionary. The court realized that Congress did not intend NEPA language
to provide federal agencies with an "escape clause" by which they could avoid
implementation of the Act. Nevertheless, it felt the language allowed agencies
some leeway in their compliance. Combining this conclusion with the court's
intention to enforce only one of the three acts, it concluded that the Safe Streets
58 42 U.S.C. § 3731 (1970) specifically enumerates the construction of buildings and other
law enforcement facilities as a purpose for which states might spend the "block" grant.
59 321 F. Supp. at 1090.
60 Id. at 1090 n.4.
61 Id. at 1093.
62 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1970).
63 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i) (1970).
64 42 U.S.C. § 3733 (1970).
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Act must take priority, stating, "[w]hen two statutes of equal efficacy conflict,
one non-discretionary
and one discretionary, the non-discretionary one must
85
prevail. 6
Secondly, the court considered NHPA, like the Safe Streets Act, to be nondiscretionary and as such had to look to a second rule of statutory interpretation
in determining that between the two, the Safe Streets Act must prevail because
it was passed subsequent to NHPA6
Thirdly, the court relied on language contained in Udall v. Tallman6 7 in
stating the judiciary will show great deference to the interpretation given a stat-

ute by the officers or agencies charged with its administration, especially where
an act is new or relatively untried. It merely required the agency's decision to
be reasonable, not that it be the only decision nor the one that the court itself
would have made. The opinion expressed no doubt that the LEAA acted reasonably in approving the "block" grant to Virginia without first considering
NEPA and NHPA. In the court's view, the terms of the Safe Streets Act were
definitely clear in unequivocably requiring the LEAA to make the grants once
an approved comprehensive plan had been filed. Since it deemed the provisions
of the Safe Streets Act to be non-discretionary, the court saw no need for LEAA
officials to look beyond its terms for provisions of other acts which might contradict those same terms.
The Green Springs residents' final claim as to defendant Brown was also
dismissed by the district court. It was their contention that Brown violated not
only NEPA and NHPA, but also that he deprived them of their constitutional
rights under the ninth and fourteenth amendments. On this point, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court.
While it acknowledged recent opinions as to the claimed right to a constitutionally protected environment, the court determined that the residents were stretching rights in their attempt to reach the action of state officials and refused to
accord judicial sanction to the constitutional claim.18 Further, the court stated
that no relief against the state official can be premised on NHPA or NEPA since
by their express language they only operate upon federal agencies and officials. 9
Despite acquiescence on these points, the court of appeals was otherwise at
odds with the district court. It centered its reversal as to the LEAA upon a
different view of statutory construction and a firmer desire to overcome the
balking of administrative officialdom in regard to environmental and cultural
improvement. The district court's approach was erroneous in several major respects and it was to these areas that the court of appeals first addressed itself.
To begin with, the district court's line of statutory construction was a last
resort measure only to be used where it is impossible to reconcile and effectuate
two statutes. The court of appeals recommended a different tact where statutes
appear to be in conflict. In such a case, the deciding court should ascertain the
underlying purpose of each and based on a "strong presumption" that one does
65 321 F. Supp. at 1093.
66 Id.
67 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
68 Ely v. Velde, Civil No. 71-1351 (4th Cir., November 8, 1971) (slipsheet opinion at 23).
69 Id.
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not repeal or amend the other, attempt to reconcile the two wherever possible.7"

Applying this construction specifically to the acts involved in Ely, it found
no real antagonism. Instead, it considered the "hands off" policy of the Safe
Streets Act to be overstated and improperly read by both the LEAA and the
district court. The court said:

[I]n the absence of unmistakable language to the contrary,we should hesitate
to read the congressional solution to one problem ...so broadly as unnecessadly to undercut solutions adopted by Congress to preserve and protect
other societal values, such, as the natural and cultural environment. It is
not to be assumed lightly that Congress intended to cancel out two7 1highly
important statutes without a word to that effect. [Emphasis added.]
The district court erroneously viewed NEPA as a statute with which federal agencies could comply at their discretion. Such a view completely ignores
the legislative history of the Act which leaves no doubt that performance of
NEPA's procedural steps was mandatorily required of agencies with few exceptions, 2 none of which were present here. The LEAA would be excepted only if
the Safe Streets Act (as its enabling statute) specifically precluded the Administration from complying, or if compliance was impossible.7" Since no such language is contained in the statute, the court of appeals correctly concluded there
was no congressional intent to forbid LEAA compliance with either NEPA or
NHPA, and that in fact there were ways in which the LEAA could integrate both
into its functions under the Safe Streets Act. The district court failed to recognize
the many areas of discretionary power which the LEAA continues to hold. It
retains direct control over 15% of crime control funds,74 takes direct control of
all funds if a state fails to submit a comprehensive plan of which it approves, 5
and has the power to discontinue or withhold funds where a state's actions differ
from those contained in the approved comprehensive plan."' Most importantly,
the Act provides for the submission of comprehensive plans "containing such
information as the Administration may reasonably require."'
These discretionary powers considered, it was certainly incumbent upon
the district court to consider whether NEPA and NIHPA could be implemented
at the time that the state comprehensive plan came to the LEAA for approval.
Assuming the Administration has no choice but to grant funds once a state plan
has been approved, this does not mean that they cannot implement NHPA and
NEPA at an earlier stage in the grant review process, specifically at the point
where they conduct their annual review of the comprehensive plan. This in
fact is what the court of appeals suggested.7" It reasoned that Congress, in
enacting the crime control legislation, had no intention of forbidding LEAA
70 Id. at 11.
71 Id. at 16.
72
73

Note 23 supra.
Note 30 supra.

74
75
76
77
78

42 U.S.C. § 3736 (1970).
42 U.S.C. § 3735 (1970).
42 U.S.C. § 3757 (1970).
42 U.S.C. § 3733 (1970).
Ely v. Velde, Civil No. 71-1351 (4th Cir., November 8, 1971) (slipsheet opinion at 17).
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compliance with environmental and cultural legislation. The court concluded
that it would not overburden the LEAA to require as a prerequisite to approval
of state plans, state submission of sufficient information to apprise controlling
administrators of the cultural and environmental impact of proposed projects or
grants, and that this step would in no way initiate a national police force or invite
further federal intervention. It seemed anomalous to the court of appeals that
the LEAA claimed implementation of NHPA and NEPA was impossible, when
according to its "Guide for Comprehensive Law Enforcement" 9 state plans
are required to include:
...

procedures established to effect coordination with plans under

(a) the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act of 1968
(b) the Model Cities Program under the Demonstration Cities and
Metropolitan Development Act of 1966
(c) the Highway Safety Act of 196[6].-0
The guidelines further require states, as well as their subgrantees and contractors,
to comply with the Civil Rights Act of 1964."1 Since none of these acts are
explicitly expressed in the Safe Streets Act, the court was hard-pressed to give
credence to the LEAA argument that there was no room for NEPA and NHPA.
It, instead, was inclined to follow Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee,
Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commission. 2 In that landmark litigation,
the court extended NEPA duties to their furthest point yet. While refusing to
reverse most substantive administration decisions on the merits of proposed projects, it made it clear that all agencies would be required to exercise good faith
procedural compliance followed by a balancing of environmental and other
factors. If the agency decision that followed was arbitrary or failed to give sufficient weight to environmental factors, it too could be reversed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, agreeing with
Calvert Cliffs', did not see NEPA as discretionary. Antithetically, it interpreted
the "fullest extent possible" language as reinforcement to the NEPA mandates
citing Calvert Cliffs' as follows:
. . . [the] language does not provide an escape hatch for footdragging
agencies, . .. [nor] make NEPA's procedural requirements somehow "discretionary". . . . Indeed, the requirement of environmental consideration

"to the fullest extent possible" sets a high standard which must be rigorously enforced by the reviewing courts.8 3
Following Calvert Cliffs', the court would not make any decision on the
merits of the Green Springs project. Rather, the court sees NHPA and NEPA
as requiring procedural compliance whereby properly relevant environmental
information will be placed before the ultimate decisionmakers on federal projects. After good faith performance of their procedural duties and careful ob79
80
81
82

Id. at 18. LEAA, GumE FO COMPREHENsrvE
Id. at 59.
Id. at 39.
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

83 449 F.2d at 1114.
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servation of environmental and cultural factors administrators will be allowed a
final decision. If they feel non-environmental priorities outweigh environmental
effects, the project may proceed as originally planned; if the environmental
costs are too great the project may be terminated; or, the administrators might
be able to modify plans or require their modification so that all priorities might
be reached.8"
By allowing administrative discretion in the final decision, the court did
not mean to permit the LEAA or any other federal agency to act arbitrarily.
This means that in an Ely situation the LEAA would not be allowed to comply
with § 4332 (C) (i) by filing a complete environmental impact statement and
then act in disregard of its findings by funding a project without proper consideration of environmental and cultural amenities. Such perfunctory compliance
will not be allowed, but rather, federal agencies will be required to fully explain
their "course of inquiry, . . . analysis and .. . reasoning" so as to insure genuine
good faith compliance."5
Judge Skelly Wright in Calvert Cliffs' stated that the judicial role in the
environmental area was to see that the promise of recent statutes which "show
the government's commitment to control at . . . last the destructive engine of
material 'progress'" was made reality."8 Ely v. Velde has gone farther than any
case to date in doing just that, and the decision will have ramifications for nearly
every federal project. The opinion makes it clear that "[i]n the absence of
unmistakable language to the contrary" (emphasis added) all federal agencies
will be forced to comply with NHPA and NEPAY
In its broadest sense, the decision provides a new impetus to citizens' suits
intended to halt environmentally degrading projects. This is accomplished by
the court's insistence upon strict procedural compliance and good faith weighing
of environmental exigencies.
It may well be argued that the LEAA has shown bad faith in the past, paying little heed to NHPA, NEPA, or the environment in general. 8 This being
true, a conclusion that procedural compliance on the Administration's part would
still not produce a proper balancing of environmental factors would not be unwarranted. However, the court made the correct decision by not going into the
specific merits of the case. Upon objective analysis, there is no question but that
the bureaucratic decisionmaking process has had an adverse effect on the national environment. Nevertheless, it would be a non sequitur to assume that this
derives from bad faith on the part of individual agency members. Rather, it
84
85
86
87

Ely v. Velde, Civil No. 71-1351 (4th Cir., November 8, 1971) (slipsheet opinion at 21).
Id. at 23.
449 F.2d at 1111.
Ely v. Velde, Civil No. 71-1351 (4th Cir., November 8, 1971) (slipsheet opinion at

16).
88 The LEAA appears to be one of the "foot-dragging" agencies to which Judge Skelly
Wright referred in Calvert Cliffs'. Despite their claimed inability to comply with NEPA, they
have yet to file a statement with the President detailing why they could not comply and suggesting means of changing their statutory authority so as to make compliance possible as
required by § 4333. 42 U.S.C. § 4333 (1970). Guidelines were finally filed by the LEAA on
October 27, 1971, long after the due date, but the Guidelines did not provide for implementation of NEPA in regard to the "block" grant portion of the Safe Streets Act. Department of
Justice, LEAA Procedural Guidelines for Implementation of NEPA, 36 Fed. Reg. 20613
(1971).
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appears to be the result of project orientation which effectively blinds agencies
to other factors.
Requirement of strict and complete procedural compliance solves this problem in two ways. First, the preparation of a well considered impact statement
available to virtually anyone has a tendency to bring the environmental factors
into the open and put controversial projects into the political arena. Additionally, assuming good faith on the part of individual administrators properly apprised of environmental factors, responsible decisions should follow and be allowed to stand. Nothing is gained by imputing better motives to judges than
administrators, nor do judicial decisions on proposed projects warrant better
consideration of environmental problems. Quite the reverse may be true. Not
only do judges lack the expertise and technical knowledge available to federal
agencies, but further, allowing judicial decisions as to the merits of individual
undertakings would leave environmental planning and other national priorities
to a select few. The blinders previously worn by project oriented agencies would
shift to issue oriented judges and nothing could be gained from the transition.
The court embodies a guarantee in its opinion against agencies that don't
make their decisions in good faith but instead act capriciously. While Ely does
not specifically allude to Overton Park, it does indicate that arbitrary and
clearly erroneous decisions will be reversed, and like Overton Park, requires
presentation of all facts upon which a decision is centered so that the court will
be able to determine the arbitrariness of any agency action brought into dispute.
The addition of this guarantee insures that decisions will be put into proper
perspective and that all factors will be seriously considered.
In addition to the general value of Ely, narrower application of the principles is also of great importance. It makes the mandates of NEPA and NHPA
clearly applicable to the LEAA and leaves no doubt that its own guidelines
for implementation are insufficient.8 9 By doing so, it has forestalled initiation of
marijuana eradication programs capable of defoliating up to ten million acres
of land in the Midwest 0 and innumerable other crime control programs that
might irreparably damage the human habitat. Such programs can no longer be
implemented without procedural compliance with NEPA and NHPA and good
faith analysis of environmental consequences. More importantly, the case has a
prescient effect on all other "block" grant spending and proposed federal revenue
sharing,9 such that future legislation embodying this type of federal financial
assistance will be similarly required to meet the Ely tenets.
89 Department of Justice, LEAA Procedural Guidelines for Implementation of NEPA, 36
Fed. Reg.20613 (1971).
90 See New York Times, June 11, 1971, at 37, col. 1; South Bend Tribune, May 24,
1971, at 15, col. 3; Vance, MarijuanaIs for the Birds, OUTDOOR LIFE, June, 1971, at 53.
91 President Nixon has proposed a bill which would implement a federal revenue sharing
program whereby 3% to 5% of Federal Personal Income Tax would be returned to the states
in "block" grant form. Similar to the Safe Streets Act, § 701 (a) of the Nixon proposal
allows the Secretary of the Treasury to establish reasonable rules and regulations. H.R. 47,
92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
Secretary Connally, appearing before the House Ways and Means Committee, stressed the
"hands-off' nature of the Act, but noted that states would be required to "account for" the
spending of federal money. Hearings on the Subject of General Revenue Sharing Before the
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. at 171

(1971).
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Ely reiterates the importance of the citizen suit in the environmental area
as the most effective check on irresponsible administrative action. However, the
decision diminishes its own importance by failing to place any duties upon Otis
L. Brown and the state welfare agency. Such a view allows for frustration of
both NEPA and NHPA in that it permits states to use "wait and see" tactics.
In other words, state administrators may elicit federal funds and planning assistance for projects in the hope that the action will not be challenged on environmental grounds. If it is, they can then use state funds for that project and replace those funds by redistributing the money from federal grants. Congress in
enacting environmental legislation certainly did not intend to permit such easy
circumvention of the acts. In stating a national policy of environmental control, the legislative purpose was to solve the problem of "federally sponsored or
aided construction activities ... which proceed without reference to the desires
and aspirations of local people." 2 Thus, NEPA, if not NHPA, was directed
not only at federal administrators and agencies, but to federal projects themselves.
Considering this fact, the court does not need to rely on constitutional grounds
or consider the ninth and fourteenth amendments at all in fashioning relief as
to state officials. They need merely rely on an interpretation stated by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Conservation Society v.Texas.93
There the court applied NEPA (and presumably would have applied NHPA
were it at issue) to a state agency which claimed it would proceed with a project
on its own if federal funds were withheld. The court would not allow such state
action because by doing so it would be giving approval to circumvention of
the applicable environmental acts. Instead, it deemed the project a federal project such that the state was now bound by federal law.
A similar situation is presented in Ely. The State of Virginia has expressed
its intention to finance the Green Springs project with state funds should the
federal funds be denied. 4 However, the federal agency has provided not only
funds but planning assistance.95 As such, in any future litigation, the court
should follow the interpretation of Conservation Society and deem the project a
federal project in which federal law must be adhered to. In doing so, the court
would make Ely's analysis of NEPA and NHPA capable of practical application
in all intended circumstances.
Jon R. Pozgay

CoNSTrTuTIoNAL

LAW-ExPATRIATION-CONGRESS

POSSESSES

THE

POWER TO DESTROY THE CITIZENSHIP OF A STATUTORY CITIZEN NOT BORN OR
NATURALIZED

WHILE PHYSICALLY

WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

FAILS TO SATISFY A REASONABLE RESIDENCY

WHEN

REQUIREMENT.--Aldo

HE

Mario

Bellei, the expatriated son of an American mother and Italian father, was born
in Italy in December, 1939, and became an American citizen at birth by virtue
92
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S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969).
Civil No. 30915 (5th Cir., August 5, 1971).
Ely v. Velde, Civil No. 71-1351 (4th Cir., November 8, 1971)

17 n. 17).
95 Id. at 19 n.22.
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of section 301 (a) (7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. That
section provides that a person born outside the United States of parents one of
whom is an alien, and the other an American citizen shall become a citizen of
the United States at birth provided the American parent, prior to the birth of
the child, has been physically present in the United States for not less than ten
years, five of which were after reaching the age of fourteen.' Since Beliei's
mother resided in the United States from the time of her birth until shortly
after her 24th birthday, the requirements for his obtaining citizenship had been
met.
That citizenship, which apparently had been fully conferred at birth, was
nevertheless subject to destruction under section 301 (b) of the Act which provides for the loss of citizenship granted under section 301 (a) (7) when the child
fails to be continuously present in the United States for at least five years between the ages of fourteen and twenty-eight.' There is no doubt that Bellei
failed to meet the requirements of section 301(b), and it was therefore concluded by the Department of State that he was no longer a citizen of this country.
From birth, Beliei had been treated as an American citizen by the United
States and had always traveled under American diplomatic protection. He
visited the United States on a number of occasions, never remaining long enough
to fulfill the residency requirements of section 301 (b). On his first two visits
he entered on his mother's United States passport, but on the next two he entered
on his own United States passport issued to him in 1952.
On several occasions, Bellei had been warned of the requirements of section
301 (b). In 1960, for example, he registered for the draft with the American
Consul in Rome and was scheduled for induction in 1963. However, due to his
employment in the NATO defense program, his induction was deferred. At
that time he was reminded of the possible loss of citizenship if he did not meet
the residency requirements. Another warning came in 1961 when his last application for a passport was approved. In July of 1963, Bellei requested and was
granted a passport extension until February of 1964. Once again notice of the
residency requirements of section 301(b) and of the consequences of a failure
to meet them was given. When Bellei failed to return to the United States on
or before the expiration date of his passport, the Department of State concluded
that he had lost his citizenship since he could no longer satisfy the requirements
of section 301 (b).
After being informed of his denationalization, Bellei instituted an action
1 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (1970). The following shall be nationals and citizens of the
United States at birth:
(7) a person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its

outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of

the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in
the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not
less than ten years, at least five of which were after attaining the age of fourteen
years....
2 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1970). Any person who is a national and citizen of the United
States at birth under paragraph (7) of subsection (a) of this section, shall lose his nationality
and citizenship unless he shall come to the United States prior to attaining the age of twentythree years and shall immediately following any such coming be continuously physically present
in the United State [sic] for at least five years: Provided, That such physical presence follows
the attainment of the age of fourteen years and precedes the age of twenty-eight years.
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against the Secretary of State seeking, a declaration that section 301 (b) of the
Act was unconstitutional. He also moved for an injunction restraining the enforcement of that provision. In a unanimous decision the United States District Court for the District of Columbia declared section 301 (b) unconstitutional
as violative of both the due process clause of the fifth amendment and the
citizenship clause of the fourteenth amendment.' On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court, by a 5-4 decision reversed the district court holding and held:
Congress has the power, consistent with the citizenship clause of the fourteenth
amendment, to destroy the citizenship granted a person not born or naturalized
in the United States and who had not been subject to its jurisdiction when he
fails to satisfy a reasonable residency requirement imposed as a condition subsequent to the grant of that citizenship. Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
Historically, the cases dealing with the issue of the existence or non-existence
of a congressional power to expatriate are indicative of widely divergent opinions
and significant shifts in emphasis. The legislation enacted, however, with the
exception of several important challenges by the Supreme Court, has had a basically uncontested development. Beginning with the common law doctrine of
indefeasible and immutable allegiance, that legislation has reached the point
where it is now apparent that, in many instances, Congress feels possessed of
the power to determine who shall lose his citizenship. The basic conflict for the
courts, however, continues to center on whether Congress has the constitutional
authority to destroy the citizenship of any person once it has been conferred,
absent a voluntary renunciation or concurrence by the citizen.
At first glance, this is a seemingly unimportant point of contention. Yet, the
realization of two basic concepts should indicate its significance. First, if unchecked, this power gives the government the prerogative to destroy the citizenship of the citizens to whom it is responsible and from whom it derives its powers.
Therefore, if the prerogative was allowed to be exercised to its fullest extent we
would no longer have a government whose source of power was the citizenry
which created it in the first instance. Second, "[c]itizenship is man's basic right
for it is nothing less than the right to have rights." 4 In America, it seems apparent that the knowledge of a person existing without the benefit of our constitutional rights and protections would be alarming to many, if not to all citizens.
Constitutionally, Congress has been authorized "[t]o establish a uniform
rule of naturalization.... ." However, that document has not granted Congress
the power to determine who shall and shall not lose his citizenship. This power
was not only withheld from Congress, but significantly, in our early history, due
to the common law doctrine of perpetual allegiance, not even the citizen himself
had the unfettered right or power to renounce his citizenship and become an
alien.6 In 1868 that doctrine was abandoned and Congress declared, through a
statutory enactment, the right of each citizen to voluntarily expatriate himself
from his country.' The statute, however, was primarily concerned with declaring
3
4

Bellei v. Rusk, 296 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1969).
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).

5

U.S. CONST. art. I,

6
7

Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 246 (1830).
Expatriation Act of 1868, ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223.

§

8.
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the right of expatriation and did not specify the acts by which that right could
be effectuated. This situation was remedied by the Citizenship Act of March 2,
1907.8 However, the point of emphasis showed a significant shift. No longer
did Congress seem concerned with declaring the fight of immigrants to renounce
allegiance to their former homelands and acquire citizenship in the United
States. The emphasis now was placed on specifying those acts by which an
American citizen would be deemed to have expatriated himself from this country.
Section 3 of that Act, for example, provided for the divestment of the citizenship
of any American woman who married an alien.' Under section 2, citizenship
could be destroyed by taking an oath of allegiance to or being naturalized in a
foreign country, or, for the naturalized American citizen, by living in his former
homeland for a period of two years."0 These provisions were apparently an attempt to avoid conflicting national claims upon United States citizens who had
acquired dual nationalities." It is significant to note, however, that the Act of
1907 has generally been considered as creating a rebuttable presumption of intent to denationalize, rather than providing for the automatic divestment of
citizenship. 2 Since intent was provided for and the divestment of citizenship
apparently was not automatic upon performance of the specified acts, the Act
of 1907 appears to be consistent with the doctrine of voluntary renunciation.
In 1915, eight years after its passage, the constitutionality of section 3 of the
Citizenship Act of March 2, 1907, providing for the loss of citizenship by marriage to an alien, was determined by the Supreme Court in Mackenzie v. Hare'
Adhering to the doctrine of voluntary expatriation, the Court declared that "[ilt
may be conceded that a change of citizenship cannot be arbitrarily imposed,
that is, imposed without the concurrence of the citizen."'" The Court, nevertheless, sustained the provision and upheld Mrs. Mackenzie's denationalization despite the fact that after her marriage to an alien she remained in the United
States and never expressly renounced her citizenship. Basically, the Court reasoned that there had been an implied concurrence since Mrs. Mackenzie entered
the marriage voluntarily with knowledge of the consequences. 5
Once again, in 1939, the Supreme Court recognized and applied the doctrine of voluntary renunciation of nationality in Perkins v. Eig'8 where it declared that "[e]xpatriation is the voluntary renunciation or abandonment of
nationality and allegiance."" Recognition of this principle allowed the Court to
8 Citizenship Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2534, 34 Stat. 1228. This Act has also been
referred to as the Expatriation Act of March 2, 1907.
9

Id. § 3.

10

Id.§2.

11

Duvall, Expatriation Under United States Law, Perez to Afroyim: The Search for a
Philosophy of American Citizenship, 56 VA. L. REv. 408, 414 (1970).
12 Hurst, Can Congress Take Away Citizenship? 29 Rocx, MT. L. REv. 62, 65 (1956);
Murphy, Loss of Nationality Under United States Law and Practice: A Foreign Policy Perspectie, 19 I-A. L. REv. 89, 91 (1970).
13 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
14 Id. at 311.
15 As will be discussed, the majority opinion in Bellei is totally devoid of any reference
to this case or to the reasoning employed. Utilization of this reasoning might have produced
the same end to Bellei's citizenship, but would probably have resulted in a great deal less
confusion and disruption.

16

307 U.S. 325 (1939).

17

Id. at 334.
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reverse the loss of citizenship determination of a person who, although born in
the United States, had been removed to and naturalized in Sweden during her
minority. The Court also concluded that section 2 of the Citizenship Act of
March 2, 19078 did not destroy the right of a citizen so removed to elect to retain her United States citizenship.' 9
The next major legislative enactment dealing with expatriation was the
Nationality Act of 194020 which greatly expanded the number of acts which, if
performed, would result in the loss of American citizenship for both the native
born and naturalized citizen. Included among these were being naturalized in
a foreign state, serving in the military of or being employed by a foreign state,
declaring allegiance to a foreign state, voting in a foreign political election, formally renouncing American nationality, deserting the United States armed forces
during time of war, and committing an act of treason against the United States.2
Under section 404 of the Act, the naturalized citizen could lose his citizenship
by reacquiring citizenship in his former country and living there for two years,
or by simply living in his former homeland for three years, or by living in any
other country for five years. It should be noted here that no provision was made
in the Act "for taking into account a person's intent or loyalty to the United
States."2 This is significant since a number of the acts resulting in the forcible
destruction of citizenship do not appear to be indicative of either a dilution of
allegiance or of a voluntary renunciation of citizenship. For example, the Supreme Court in Schneider v. Rusk"5 declared that living abroad is not an indication of lack of allegiance "and in no way evidences a voluntary renunciation of
nationality and allegiance." 24 The failure to provide for taking even implicit
intent and concurrence into consideration also signifies the beginning of a trend
away from the doctrine of voluntary renunciation as that doctrine was enunciated
earlier in Mackenzie where the Court noted that citizenship could not be taken
away without the concurrence of the citizen.
Yet, what makes the expatriation provisions of the Nationality Act of 1940
even more questionable is that they appear to have been enacted in spite of earlier
constitutional principles announced by the Supreme Court. For example, in
United States v. Wong Kim Ark,2" the Court declared that "[t]he power of
naturalization, vested in Congress by the Constitution, is a power to confer citi' The Court went on to state that:
zenship, not a power to take it away."27
The Fourteenth Amendment, while it leaves the power, where it was before,
in Congress, to regulate naturalization, has conferred no authority upon
18 Citizenship Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 2, 34 Stat. 1228, provides that any
American citizen shall be deemed to have expatriated himself when he"has been naturalized in
any foreign state in conformity with its laws.
19 307 U.S. 325, 343 (1939).
20 Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137.
21 Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, §§ 401(a)-(h), 54 Stat. 1168, as amended, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1481 (a) (1964).
22
23

Hurst, supra note 12, at 66.
377 U.S. 163 (1964).

24

Id. at 169.

25
26
27

Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915).
169 U.S. 649 (1898).
Id. at 703.
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Congress to restrict the effect of birth, declared by the
28 Constitution to constitute a sufficient and complete right to citizenship.
Since the Constitution grants Congress no power to take away citizenship, what
had apparently made it constitutionally possible in the past for Congress to declare those acts by which a citizen would be deemed to have lost his citizenship
was the doctrine of voluntary renunciation combined with the notion of implicit
concurrence. However, the Nationality Act of 1940 effectively eliminated any
consideration of these concepts. Therefore, constitutionally, the expatriation
provisions of the Act became suspect.
Yet, despite these earlier cases and the conclusion for which they would
seem to call, a further blow was dealt the doctrine of voluntary expatriation and
29
the concept of implicit concurrence by the Supreme Court in Perez v. Brownell.
Perez was born in the United States, but later moved to Mexico with his parents.
While in Mexico he voted in -a political election. By such an act, it was determined that he had expatriated himself pursuant to section 401 (e) of the Nationality Act of 1940.0 Recognizing that Congress has the power to regulate foreign
affairs, the majority concluded that under this power, Congress could also regulate the withdrawal of citizenship." Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority,
went on to state that, "it would be a mockery of this Court's decisions to suggest
that a person, in order to lose his citizenship, must intend or desire tO do so."3 2
The Court also totally ignored the concept of implied intent which it could
easily have considered "based on Perez's voluntary performance of an expatriating act, coupled with the general rule that every citizen is presumed to know
the law and to understand the legal consequences of his voluntary acts." 3 In a
strong dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Warren stated that by virtue of the
fourteenth amendment, "United States citizenship is . . . the constitutional
birthright of every person born in this country." 4 The citizenship clause of that
amendment provides simply that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside." 35 The Chief Justice continued to dissent
by recalling the constitutional principle previously declared by the Court in
Wong Kim Ark where it was noted that although Congress had the power to
regulate naturalization, it had no power to restrict the effect of birth declared
by the fourteenth amendment." Addressing himself to the doctrine of voluntary
expatriation, Chief Justice Warren stated that, "[ilt has long been recognized
that citizenship may not only be voluntarily renounced through exercise of the

28 Id.
29
30

356 U.S. 44 (1958).
Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 401, 55 Stat. 1169. A person who is a national of

the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: (e) Voting
in a political election in a foreign state ...
31 356 U.S. 44, 59 (1958).
32 Id. at 61.
33 Duvall, supra note 11, at 422.
34 356 U.S. 44, 66 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
35 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
36

356 U.S. 44, 66 (1958)

(dissenting opinion).
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right of expatriation but also by other actions in derogation of undivided allegiance to this country.""7 He also noted:
.. . Mackenzie v. Hare should not be understood to sanction a power to
divest citizenship. Rather this case . . . simply acknowledges that United
States citizenship can be abandoned, temporarily or permanently, by conduct showing a voluntary transfer of allegiance to another country.38
The logic of his opinion, nevertheless, was rejected by the majority.
It was not long, however, before the dissent in Perez became the rule as the
tables were again turned in Trop v. Dulles39 which was argued and decided immediately after Perez. This should give some indication of the confusion which
existed in the past regarding the issue of a congressional power to expatriate.
In Trap, petitioner was convicted by a general court-martial of desertion and
had received a dishonorable discharge as a result. Under section 401 (g) of the
Nationality Act of 1940,40 this was also sufficient to result in the divestment of
his nationality. Declaring that provision unconstitutional on eighth amendment
grounds, Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority stated:
As long as a person does not voluntarily renounce or abandon his citizenship, and this petitioner has done neither, I believe his fundamental right
of citizenship is secure. On this ground alone the judgement in this case
should be reversed. 41
He also reiterated the opinion from his dissent in Perez that citizenship could
not be divested by the exercise of the general powers of the government, but that
it could be voluntarily destroyed "by express language or by language and conduct that show a renunciation of citizenship."'4
This trend back to the doctrine of voluntary expatriation and the concept
of implicit concurrence was perpetuated when, six years later, the Supreme
Court, in Schneider v. Rusk,4" invalidated section 352 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952." That section provided for the divestment of the citizenship of any naturalized American who, for three years, continuously resided
in his former homeland. Recognizing that the statute did not prescribe the same
penalty for the native born citizen who lived abroad, the Court held that section
352 involved an unjustifiable discrimination and was therefore violative of fifth
amendment due process.45 The majority also expressed its continued support
for the doctrine of voluntary expatriation when it stated that "[1]iving abroad,
whether the citizen be naturalized or native born, is no badge of lack of alle37
38

Id. at 68 (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 73 (dissenting opinion).

39

356 U.S. 86 (1958).

40 Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 401, 54 Stat. 1169, provides a person who is a
national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by:
(g) Deserting the military or naval service of the United States in time of war, provided he is
convicted thereof by a court martial.

41

356 U.S. 86, 93 (1958).

42

Id. at 92.

43

377 U.S. 163 (1964).

45

377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964).

44 8 U.S.O. § 1484(a)(1)(1970).
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glance and
in no way evidences a voluntary renunciation of nationality and alle46
giance."
It has been noted that in its decisions subsequent to Perez, the Court "portended the rejection of Congressional power to take away an American citizen's
'
citizenship without his consent."47
However, it was not until its decision in
Afroyim v. Rusk' that the Supreme Court conclusively held that Congress had
no general power, express or implied, to divest an American citizen of his citizenship without his assent."9 The petitioner in Afroyim was a naturalized American
citizen who had traveled to Israel and, while there, voted in a political election.
Upon application for a renewal of his United States passport, the State Department denied issuance and concluded that he had lost his citizenship under section
401 (e) of the Nationality Act of 1940." In the Perez decision, nine years earlier, section 401(e) was held to be constitutional. 5 Overruling that decision
by declaring section 401(e) unconstitutional, the Court in Afroyim stated:
We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to, and does, protect every citizen of this Nation against a congressional forcible destruction
of his citizenship, whatever his creed, color, or race. Our holding does no
more than to give to this citizen that which is his own, a constitutionalright
to remain a
citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that
2
citizenship.

After reviewing the legislative history of the fourteenth amendment, the Court
concluded that its sponsors "wanted to put citizenship beyond the power of any
governmental unit to destroy. 5 3 This would appear to be more consistent with

the dictum announced by the Supreme Court in 1824 in Osborn v. United
States Bank 4 Noting that once a person becomes a naturalized citizen he
possesses all the rights of the native born citizen, the Court stated:
The constitution does not authorize congress to enlarge or abridge those
rights. The simple power of the national legislature is to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and the exercise of this power exhausts it, so
far as respects the individual. 55
In view of the most recent trend culminating in Afroyim with the declaration of a constitutional right to remain a citizen until voluntary renunciation
and an emphatic denial of the existence of any congressional power to destroy
citizenship, it would appear that since Mr. Bellei had apparently been granted
complete citizenship at birth, his citizenship would be indestructible except by
46 Id. at 169.
47 Comment, An Expatriation Enigma: Afroyim v. Rusk, 48 B.U.L. Rev. 295 (1968).
48 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
49 Id. at 257.
50 Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 401, 54 Stat. 1169. A person who is a national
of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: (e)
Voting in a political election in a foreign state....
51 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
52 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967) (emphasis added).
53 Id. at 263.
54 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
55 Id. at 827.
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a voluntary renunciation or some other dilution of allegiance. However, once
again, in what continues to be characteristic of the decisions in this area, the
Court in Bellei reversed its position. Completely ignoring the doctrine of voluntary expatriation and the concept of implied concurrence, the Court upheld
the constitutionality of section 301 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, and therefore the subsequent divestment of Bellei's citizenship. The majorit, declared that:
The central fact, in our weighing of the plaintiff's claim to continuing
and therefore current United States citizenship, is that he was born abroad.
He was not born in the United States. He was not naturalized in the United
States. And he has not been subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
All this being so, it seems indisputable that the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment has no application to plaintiff
6 Bellei. He simply is not
a Fourteenth-Amendment-first-sentence citizen5
It was apparently due to the conclusion that Bellei was not protected by the
fourteenth amendment and that his citizenship therefore could be constitutionally destroyed by congressional enactment that the Court saw no need to refer
to the doctrine of voluntary expatriation or to the concept of implied concurrence.
For a number of reasons, however, the Court's sustaining Bellei's loss of
citizenship on the ground that he was not a first-sentence fourteenth amendment
citizen is dubious at best. The Court in Afroyim held that the fourteenth amendment protected every citizen against the forcible destruction of his citizenship by
Congress."7 Conversely, the Court did not interpret the amendment as protecting only those citizens born or naturalized while physically within the borders
of the United States. Also, in 1950, the Court in Savorgnan v. United States"
was faced with the question of interpreting the words "naturalized in" as was the
Court in Bellei. In Savorgnan, however, the constitutionality of section 2 of the
Citizenship Act of March 2, 1907 was in question. That section provided that
"any American citizen shall be deemed to have expatriated himself when he
has been naturalized in any foreign state in conformity with its laws. . .. ""
Petitioner there made the argument that since her naturalization did not take
place within the boundaries of a foreign state her case did not come within the
purview of section 2 of the Act. Dismissing her contention as "novel," the Court
stated:
The answer is that the phrase in § 2 which states that "any American citizen shall be deemed to have expatriated himself when he has been naturalized in any foreign state in conformity with its laws, . . ." (emphasis sup-

plied) refers merely to naturalization into the citizenship of any foreign
state. 6It0 does not refer to the place where the naturalization proceeding
occurs.

56 Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 827 (1971).
57 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967).
58 338 U.S. 491 (1950).
59 Citizenship Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2534, § 2, 34 Stat. 1228 (emphasis added).
60 Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491, 499 (1950) (emphasis added).
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This appears to indicate that, when used in the context of the naturalization
process, the words "naturalized in" have previously been understood to mean
simply becoming a citizen by the laws of a particular country. Justice Black,
dissenting in Bellei, declared that "[t]he final version of the Citizenship Clause
was undoubtedly intended to have this same scope."'" If the interpretation given
the words "naturalized in" in Savorgnan was followed by the Court in Bellei
when interpreting those same words from the fourteenth amendment, Bellei
clearly would have been protected by that amendment against the forcible
destruction of his citizenship since he had become a citizen in conformity with
prescribed laws. Under the Court's decision in Afroyim, he would also be entitled
to the "constitutional right to remain a citizen ... unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship."62
The fact remains, however, that the majority in Bellei chose not to follow
precedent. By employing the more literal interpretation of the citizenship clause
the majority creates the impression that the determination of who shall lose their
American citizenship depends more on the makeup of the Court and what they
consider expedient, than on prior decisions interpreting both expatriation statutes
and the Constitution. As Justice Black declared: "This precious Fourteenth
Amendment American citizenship should not be blown around by every passing
political wind that changes the composition of this Court.""8
The majority also bases its decision, in part, on the conclusion that the
statute in question conferred full citizenship only upon the satisfaction of the
condition subsequent of residing in the United States for five years between
the ages of fourteen and twenty-eight. Yet, it seems apparent from the language
employed in the statute that this conclusion is erroneous. Bellei obtained his
citizenship by virtue of section 301 (a) (7) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952. That section begins with the statement that "the following shall be
nationals and citizens of the United States at birth."" Also, section 301(b)
under which Bellei was expatriated speaks in terms of a loss of citizenship. Read
together, these sections do not appear to defer the grant of citizenship until the
residency requirement is met. If given the same literal interpretation that the
Court gave the citizenship clause of the fourteenth amendment, section
301 (a) (7) apparently conferred citizenship at birth. Consequently, section
301 (b) destroyed that citizenship after it had been granted. Thus, the provision
involved the assumption that Congress possessed the power to destroy citizenship once it had been granted without considering the citizen's assent. This is in
direct conflict with the statement made in Wong Kim Ark where the Supreme
Court declared that the naturalization power granted to Congress by the Constitution included only the power to confer citizenship, and not the power to destroy
that citizenship once it had been created.65 Significant also is the Court's deviation from the constitutional principle announced five years earlier in Afroyim
61

401 U.S. 815, 843 (1971)

62

387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967).

63
64

401 U.S. 815, 837 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
8 U.S.C. § 1401 (a)(7) (emphasis added).

65 169 U.S. 649, 703 (1898).

(dissenting opinion).
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that Congress did not possess the power to divest a person of his citizenship
without his- assent.6"
Assuming Bellei did in fact become a naturalized citizen at birth as the
statute clearly indicates, then as noted in Osborn, "[h]e becomes a member of the
society, possessing all the rights of a native citizen, and standing, in the view of
the constitution, on the footing of a native."67 If Bellei possessed all the rights
of a native citizen and stood, constitutionally speaking, on equal footing, then it
is clear that he must also have acquired the constitutional right announced by
the Supreme Court in Afro yim: to remain a citizen until he chooses to voluntarily
relinquish that citizenship.6" However, the majority was apparently of the
opinion that since Belli was not entitled to fourteenth amendment protection, he
also had not acquired the constitutional right to remain a citizen until voluntary
renunciation of that citizenship. As previously indicated, the majority's reliance
on the conclusion that Bellei was not a fourteenth amendment citizen is questionable.
Essentially what the Court did in Bellei, therefore, was to sanction the
assumption by Congress of the power to destroy citizenship once it had been
granted without taking the citizen's assent into consideration. Equally alarming
was the stamp of approval given by the Court to an act of Congress which
obviously created a second-class citizen. Although the majority rejected the
assertion that the statute or its decision had this effect, it seems undeniable in
view of the fact that Bellei, although a citizen, had been denied a number of
constitutional rights which other citizens possessed. Not only was he denied
fourteenth amendment protection and the constitutional right to remain a
citizen until voluntary relinquishment, but also he apparently never acquired
the constitutional right to due process of law under the fifth amendment. Bellei
suffered divestment of citizenship which penalty the statute did not prescribe
for the native born citizen who acted in the same manner as the statutory
citizen. Under the Court's decision in Schneider, this would amount to an unjustifiable discrimination and, therefore, a violation of the due process clause
of the fifth amendment.
It seems apparent, therefore, that the more plausible approach would have
been for the Court to concede both the fact that Bellei was a complete citizen at
birth, and was entitled to fourteenth amendment protection. Although this
would have given Bellei the constitutional right announced in Afroyim to remain
a citizen until he voluntarily relinquished that citizenship,69 it would not necessarily have dictated a reversal of the Court's determination that he lost his
citizenship. Arguably, Bellei also implicitly concurred in his expatriation as did
Mrs. Mackenzie since, because of the warnings given, he too acted voluntarily
and with knowledge of the consequences. Also, by treating the issue in this
manner, it appears that the Court would be acting in conformity with the Constitution as well as its more recent decisions.
Essentially, the result of deciding the case as it did will be confusion and
66
67
68
69

387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967).
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 737, 827 (1824).
387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967).
Id.

[Vol. 47:1067]

CASE COMMENTS

disruption where finally there appeared to be understanding and stability. Unfortunately, this has been the rule rather than the exception arising from many
of the cases in the expatriation area. Yet, what remains all too clear is the fact
that the same basic issue has continually been decided and redecided differently
by the courts; that is, does Congress possess the power to forcibly destroy the
citizenship of any citizen without his assent? It becomes apparent, therefore,
that we do not yet have an "understanding of the nature and extent of the
expatriation power."70 Yet, because of the fact that "[c]itizenship... is nothing
less than the right to have rights,"'" the Court, as well as Congress, should be
hesitant to act under an assumption of power not granted by the Constitution.
Joseph M. David, Jr.

INVASION OF PRIVACY-UNREASONABLE INTRUsIoN-A WEAPON AGAINST
PRIVACY.-A.A. Dietemann was

INTRUSIONS UPON OUR SHRINKING RIGHT OF

engaged in the practice of healing through the use of clay, minerals and herbs.
This practice was characterized by the district court as "simple quackery."'
Dietemann made no charges for his services, accepted no contributions and did
not advertise. His practice was conducted in his own home behind a locked gate.
On September 20, 1963, pursuant to an agreement with the Los Angeles
County District Attorney's office, two of the defendant's employees called on
the plaintiff and gained entrance to his house by falsely claiming to have been
sent by a mutual friend. Once inside, one of the employees explained that she
had a lump in her breast. Plaintiff examined her using various nonmedical
gadgets and diagnosed the problem as having arisen from the consumption of
rancid butter eleven years, nine months and seven days prior. Without plaintiff's
knowledge, pictures were taken of the examination and his conversation was
transmitted to a tape recorder located in a car which was occupied by a third
employee and representatives from the district attorney's office and the State
Department of Public Health.
On October 15, 1963, Dietemann was arrested and charged with practicing
medicine without a license in violation of California law. On November 1, 1963,
Life magazine published an article entitled "Crackdown on Quackery" which
included pictures taken at the plaintiff's home on September 30 and was based,
in part, on the information transmitted on that date. Dietemann subsequently
brought a diversity action for invasion of privacy in the United States District
Court for the Central District of California 2 The district court found that publication of the pictures taken on September 20, 1963, constituted a tortious invasion of the plaintiff's privacy under California law and was not protected by
the first amendment. In addition, the court found that defendant's employees
were acting as agents of the law enforcement officials and, as such, had conducted an illegal search and seizure which violated Dietemann's constitutionally
70 Duvall, supra note 11, at 410.
71 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958)

(Warren, C.J., dissenting).

1 Dietemann v. Time, Incorporated, 284 F. Supp. 925 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
2 Id.
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protected right of privacy entitling him to relief under the Civil Rights Act.'
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declined
to reach the issue of plaintiff's constitutional right of privacy but affirmed and
held: a cause of action was established and plaintiff was entitled to relief under
California law when defendant's employees gained entrance to plaintiff's house
by subterfuge, photographed him and transmitted his conversation to third
persons without his consent. Dietemann v.Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir.
1971).
While prior mention of a right of privacy can be found," it was not recognized as a separate cause of action in any English or American court until the
Warren-Brandeis article' in 1890.' In that article the authors reviewed various
cases granting relief for defamation, invasion of property rights, breach of implied contract or confidence and concluded that what was really being protected
was a broader right of privacy. Certain aspects, including the development of
the right of privacy, are related to actions for defamation but it is important to
separate the two. Defamation, whether the offending conduct be classed as
libel or slander, affects one's reputation or good name and requires some element of publication or communication to third parties.' Privacy, on the other
hand, deals with one's peace of mind8 or right to be let alone.'
In 1902, Miss Abigail Roberson brought an action against the Rochester
Folding Box Company for using her picture on advertisement circulars without
her consent. The New York Court of Appeals refused to recognize the existence
of a right of privacy and reversed the decision of the lower court."0 Public
opinion was so adverse to this decision that the New York Legislature enacted
a limited right-of-privacy statute covering the commercial use of a person's name
or picture," which statute remains the law in New York today. The Supreme
Court of Georgia, faced with a similar situation, three years later, rejected the
New York court's reasoning by declaring that recognition of the right of privacy
would not be an invasion of the legislative province as the concept of a right
3

4

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). This section provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
E.g., T. COOLEY, LAW oirTORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888); De May v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160,

9 N.W. 146 (1881).
5

6
1967).

Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
R.ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A, comment a at 101 (Tent. Draft No. 13,

7 W. PROSSER, LAW oF, TORTS §§ 111, 113 (4th ed. 1971).
8 "The right of privacy concerns one's own peace of mind, while the right of freedom
from defamation concerns primarily one's reputation." Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equipment Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 86, 291 P.2d 194, 197 (1955).
9 T. CooLEY, LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
10 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
11 N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1948). This section provides:
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the purposes
of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without having first
obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her parent or
guardian, isguilty of a misdemeanor.
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of privacy was derived from the natural law.' These beginnings became the
basis for much of the future development in the area and the right of privacy
is now recognized to some degree in all states except Nebraska, Rhode Island,
Texas and Wisconsin."
California first recognized the right in Melvin v. Reid.' The plaintiff had
been a prostitute and was involved in a highly publicized murder trial. She was
acquitted, abandoned her former occupation, was married and led a relatively
quiet life. Eight years after her acquittal the defendant released a film entitled
"The Red Kimono." The film was based primarily on facts brought out at the
plaintiff's trial and therefore a matter of public record. The California court
declared that while the use of information which was a matter of public record
was not an invasion of the plaintiff's right of privacy, the use of her true maiden
name was. Noting that the rehabilitation of the fallen and the reformation of
criminals were major objectives of society, the court said:
Where a person has by his own efforts rehabilitated himself, we... should
permit him to continue in the path of rectitude rather than throw him
back into a life of shame or crime.' 5
As Georgia had done in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 6 the court
based the
right of privacy on the constitutional guarantee of life, liberty and hap7
piness.

It should be noted that the activity complained of in the Melvin case was
publication of private matters of the plaintiff's life while in Roberson and
Pavesich there was not necessarily any embarrassing private matter divulged
but rather an economic exploitation of the plaintiffs' pictures. In its present
development, the right of privacy can be broken into four separate torts:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another ....
Appropriation of the other's name or likeness....
Unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life....
Publicity which unreasonably places the other in a false light before

the public....

IS

The Melvin case involved (c) while Roberson and Pavesich involved (b). The
first of these torts focuses on the means by which the objectionable information
is obtained and requires no element of publication." Likewise, the actual content of the information acquired is immaterial so long as there has been an
12 "The right of privacy within certain limits is a right derived from natural law, recognized by the principles of municipal law, and guarantied to persons in this state both by the
Constitutions of the United States and of the State of Georgia, in those provisions which declare that no person shall be deprived of liberty except by due process of law." Pavesich v.
New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 197, 50 S.E. 68, 71 (1905).
13 W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117 at 804 (4th ed. 1971).
14 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
15 Id. at 292, 297 P. at 93.
16 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
17 112 Cal. App. at 291, 297 P. at 93.
18 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967).
19 Id. at § 652B, comment a at 103.
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intrusion into another's privacy2 0 The intrusion must, however, be of a nature
that is offensive to the reasonable man and the area intruded into must be
entitled to privacy.2' In Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co.,22 there was no invasion of
privacy when the defendant took a picture of plaintiffs while they were in an
affectionate pose because they were in a public place which was not entitled to
privacy. The nature of the intrusion necessary to constitute an actionable invasion of privacy is described by Pearson v. Dodd." Several members and
former members of Senator Dodd's staff copied papers from his files and turned
them over to the defendants, Jack Anderson and Drew Pearson who later published articles containing information from the documents. The Senator sued
for invasion of privacy and, on appeal from a decision in favor of the defendants,
Judge Skelly Wright noted that because of Dodd's position as a United States
Senator and because the published material bore on his qualifications for office,
the publication did not constitute an invasion of privacy. The court found, however, that the Senator's employees had committed an improper intrusion by removing confidential files with the intent to show them to unauthorized persons.
The defendants, on the other hand, had not participated in the actual intrusion
and could not be held liable.
There need not be an actual physical intrusion for an invasion of privacy
to take place24 and the action based on intrusion has been extended to cover
eavesdropping25 and wiretapping." This branch of invasion of privacy closely
resembles the fourth amendment protections provided against unreasonable
search and seizure. Indeed, the reasonable expectations of privacy test developed
28
in Katz v. United States" has been applied to this area.
The second branch of invasion of privacy is exemplified by the Roberson
and Pavesich cases. It gives a cause of action for the appropriation of one's
name or likeness for the use or benefit of another and usually arises where the
plaintiff's name or picture is used to advertise the defendant's business or product.
Mere use of the same name, however, may not be enough, rather the defendant
must have attempted to pass himself off as the person whose name he is using.
There must be an appropriation of some character of the defendant such as
29
prestige or standing in the public eye.
A third type of invasion concerns unreasonable publicity given to one's
private life. This branch is not concerned with the truth or falsity of the material
published, rather the focus is on the publication of material concerning an individual's private life which is highly offensive to the reasonable man with
20 Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969).
21 W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117 at 808 (4th ed. 1971).
22 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953).
23 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
24 Id. at 704.
25 E.g., Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964); Roach v. Harper,
143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958); McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60
Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939).
26 E.g., Fowler v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 343 F.2d 150 (5th
Cir. 1965).
27 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
28 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
29 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C, comment c at 109 (Tent. Draft No. 13,
1967).
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ordinary sensibilities." The material published must concern some aspect of
the plaintiff's life which is entitled to privacy and the publication must be of a
general nature and not just to a few isolated persons." In Gill v. Hearst Pub.
Co., 2 defendant's employee took a photograph of the plaintiffs while they were
seated in an affectionate pose at their confectionary in the Los Angeles Farmers'
Market. The picture was subsequently used to illustrate an article about poetic
love which appeared in defendant's magazine. Plaintiffs sued for an invasion of
their privacy but recovery was denied because the material published was neither
offensive to the reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities nor did it concern an
aspect of plaintiffs' lives which was entitled to privacy. The plaintiffs had voluntarily exposed themselves to all who may have been near their place of business
and therefore waived their right of privacy as to that particular pose.88
Lastly, one who is subjected to publicity which places him in a false light
in the public eye may have a cause of action for invasion of privacy if such
publicity is highly offensive to the reasonable man. There is authority for the
proposition that, unlike an action for unreasonable publicity, there need be no
disclosure of private affairs but only false statements about the plaintiff which
-are considered offensive to ordinary sensibilities.84 California apparently does not
follow this approach but requires disclosure of some element of plaintiff's private
life. 5
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court, by its decision in Time, Inc. v.
8
Hill," extended the protections given to potentially libelous publications developed in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 7 to cover actions for invasion of
privacy. In Hill, plaintiffs brought an action under the New York Right of
Privacy Statute, 8 which action can best be classified as involving a publication
which placed the plaintiffs in a false light. The court ruled that:
. . . the constitutional protections for speech and press preclude the application of the New York statute to redress false reports of matters of
public interest in the absence of proof that the defendant published the
report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth3 9
In light of other extensions of the .New York Times standard developed in
Rosenblatt v. Baer,"' CurtisPublishing Co. v. Butts,"' and Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 2 it would appear that the first amendment protection has application to
any invasion of privacy except appropriation for personal advantage and unreasonable intrusion. Indeed, it was on the basis of intrusion that the circuit
30 Id. § 652D, comment d at 115.

31 Id. comment b and c at 113, 114.
32
33
34
1967).
35
36
37

40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953).
Id. at 230, 253 P.2d at 444.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E, comment c at 121 (Tent. Draft No. 13,
Patton v. Royal Industries, Inc., 263 Cal. App. 2d 760, 70 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1968).
385 U.S. 374 (1967).
376 U.S. 254 (1964).

38 N.Y. Civ. RiGHTS LAw § 50 (McKinney 1948).
39 385 U.S. at 387.
40
41
42

383 U.S. 75 (1966).
388 U.S. 130 (1967).
403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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court upheld the judgement in Dietemann and not on the publication theory
used by the district court. In Rosenbloom, the Court abandoned the public
figure requirement for the application of the New York Times standard stating:
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly
become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because
in some sense the individual did not "voluntarily" choose to become involved.4 3 [Emphasis added.]
While Rosenbloom did not deal with an action for invasion of privacy, it is
probably safe to assume that its extension of the constitutional privilege to matters of legitimate public interest (regardless of the notoriety of the person involved) will be applied to those areas of invasion of privacy that concern publication of false and private information. It is submitted that the constitutional
privilege of free press cannot have application to actions for unreasonable intrusion. Intrusion deals not with freedom of expression or of the press to print
what it finds but with the methods used in obtaining the information that it
prints. 4"' If one were to say that the freedom to print necessarily implies a
freedom of access, then the press must enjoy some constitutional right not
enjoyed by the public at large. It is not maintained that the press should be
denied access to material of legitimate public interest, but merely that they should
be governed by the same standards of decency and respect for the individual that
govern other members of society.
In Griswold v. Connecticut,4 5 a divided Supreme Court ruled that a Connecticut statute banning the use of contraceptives was unconstitutional as an
invasion of the right of privacy of married persons. Justice Douglas, writing for
the plurality, stated:
[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one. . . . The Third
Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any
house" in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet
of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its SelfIncrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
the government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The
Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people." 46
Even with this broad authority, the Court has refused to recognize a general
constitutional right of privacy4" but has taken a case by case approach singling
43
44
45

Id. at 43.
Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883 (3rd Cir. 1958).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).

46

Id. at 484.
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E.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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out certain rights or zones protected under the constitutional right of privacy
and others which are not. Among those rights deemed to be within the constitutional protection are many which are equally recognized as falling within the
tort of intrusion. Probably because Griswold dealt with the marital relationship
and generally with sexual relations, subsequent cases have established that the
Constitution protects an individual from intrusions into his private sexual
habits."8 Likewise, the methods used and the conduct of those obtaining information must meet constitutional standards. The stomach-pump tactics of Rochin v.
California49 and the shocking conduct of the police in York u. Story" will not be
permitted either by constitutional or common law standards of justice and
decency. The right most closely approaching the tort of intrusion is the fourth
amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure. Since Mapp v.
Ohio,"1 the fruits of an illegal search and seizure are excluded from evidence in
subsequent criminal prosecutions. In the Katz case, the Court discarded the
physical invasion test and recognized that verbal as well as tangible evidence
could be the subject of an unlawful search and seizure, thereby extending fourth
amendment protections to eavesdropping. If one views closely the reasonableexpectations-of-privacy test developed in Katz, it cannot be denied that what is
being protected is the defendant's right of privacy.
Although the interest protected by an action for invasion of privacy and
the constitutional right of privacy is the same, the scope of the interest and
conduct necessary to violate that interest differ greatly. In United States v.
White,5" the Supreme Court narrowed the protection against eavesdropping
afforded by the fourth amendment by allowing a bugged agent to obtain evidence
by subterfuge so long as his conduct, had he not been bugged, did not violate
the defendant's fourth amendment rights.5" The Court relied on Hoffa v. United
States" and Lewis v. United States" as authority for the proposition that defendant's misplaced confidence could not constitutionally invalidate the evidence
obtained through an informer. This misplaced confidence, however, was brought
about by deceit. Even prior to the formal recognition of the right of privacy,
this concept of misplaced confidence through deceit was recognized as constituting tortious conduct. In De May v. Roberts, 8 when a doctor attending a
pregnant woman failed to inform either the woman or her husband that the
young, unmarried man accompanying and assisting him was not a doctor or
medical man, the Michigan court allowed recovery stating:
The plaintiff had a legal right to the privacy of her apartment at such a
time, and the law secures to her this right by requiring others to observe it,
and to abstain from its violation. The fact that at the time, she consented to
48 "[Ojfficial inquiry into a person's private sexual habits does violence to his constitutionally protected zone of privacy.' In Re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 824, 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).

49 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
50
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52
53
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the presence of Scattergood supposing him to be a physician, does not
substantial damages
preclude her from maintaining an action and recovering
57
upon afterwards ascertaining his true character.

In addition, Dean Prosser states that consent will be ineffective if given under a
mistake as to the nature of the act consented to if the defendant is aware of the

mistake and takes advantage of it."8
For a better view of what interests are considered to be within the constitutional right of privacy, it is helpful to look at some of the actions brought under
the Civil Rights Act.59 In Monroe v. Pape,6" the Court held that an illegal
search by Chicago police was a violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights and
therefore within the coverage of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In that case thirteen police
officers, with no warrant, broke into plaintiffs' home, rousted them from bed,
forced them to stand naked in the living room and ransacked the entire house."
In York v. Story,62 police officers coerced the plaintiff, who came to the police
station to lodge a complaint, to be photographed in various indecent poses and

subsequently circulated the pictures among other police personnel. The court
ruled that plaintiff's constitutional right of privacy had been invaded and that
the police conduct was actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Travers V.

Paton,"s the court refused to find that secret filming and recording of plaintiff's
parole hearing was a violation of his constitutional right of privacy. The court

distinguished York on the grounds that the invasion there was of a nature that
enraged the community's sense of dignity. The court noted, however, that the
elements of privacy found in Mapp and Rochin were examples of interests that
were clearly protected by the Constitution. 4 Similarly, in Mattheis v. Hoyt,6" a
prisoner who sought damages against a police chief and magazine publisher for
publishing a story of his criminal activities was not allowed to bring his action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the court found that the publication did not
violate a federally protected right. The court in Davis v. Firmen" refused to
classify the right of free choice in grooming as a constitutionally protected right of
privacy and interpreted the Griswold case as granting protection only to those
rights that are so sacred as to be fundamental. While the courts have refused to

expand the constitutional right of privacy beyond those rights that are considered

"fundamental"6 " or "traditionally regarded as private in nature,"6 it is clear that

an individual's right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure is a right
which is considered to exemplify one's fundamental right of privacy.69
57
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United States v. Laub Baking Co., 283 F.Supp. 217, 228 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
E.g., Felber v. Foote, 321 F. Supp. 85 (D. Conn. 1970); Travers v. Paton, 261 F.
110 (D. Conn. 1966); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).

[Vol. 47:1067]

CASE COMMENTS

In Dietemann, the circuit court properly shifted the emphasis from the pub0
lication theory relied on by the lower court to a theory of -intrusion."
In light
of the Hill and Rosenbloom decisions by the United States Supreme Court, it is
doubtful that the judgement of the district court could have been upheld solely
on the basis of publication. It cannot be denied that the quackery which Life
magazine sought to expose was a matter of "public or general interest"' within
the meaning of the Rosenbloom decision and therefore protected by the first
amendment. The district court's reliance on Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co. "' for the
proposition that the right of privacy may limit the freedom of press is also
misplaced as the court there was dealing with publication. There had been no
actionable intrusion. For a publication to be protected, it need only concern
an item of legitimate public interest and, if false, not be printed with knowledge
of the falsity or in reckless disregard for the truth. As was noted by the circuit
court, however:
Privilege concepts developed in defamation cases and to some extent in
privacy actions in which publication is an essential component are not rele73
vant in determining liability for intrusive conduct antedating publication.
The manner in which the material is obtained is the subject of intrusion and
must be examined in the light of cases dealing with that cause of action and not
those dealing with publication.
Prior to the Dietemann case, California had apparently not accepted the
validity of an action based solely on intrusion, 74 but some conduct amounting to
intrusion had been recognized as a violation of the constitutional right of privacy.
In Britt u. Superior Court,"' a police officer secreted himself in a ceiling over
some toilet stalls and filmed certain homosexual acts through an opening in the
ceiling. In a subsequent suppression proceeding, the Supreme Court of California ruled that such activity on the part of the police officer constituted an unreasonable invasion of the defendant's privacy and rendered the film inadmissible in his prosecution. Other jurisdictions that have dealt with the subject have
allowed recovery for unauthorized eavesdropping on an intrusion theory," but
they have dealt with situations where the defendant had bugged a room and left
to overhear the conversation from another location. They were not faced with
the false friend or misplaced trust situation where the defendant has express or
implied consent to see or hear what is going on and surreptitiously photographs,
transmits or records the incidents. In Dietemann, the district court, having
found that defendant's employees were acting as agents of the law enforcement
officials, used a constitutional standard and found that an illegal search and
70 449 F.2d at 249.
71 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971).
72 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952).

73 449 F.2d at 249-50.

74 Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925 at 929 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Dietemann v.
Time, Inc., 449 F.2d at 249.
75 58 Cal. 2d 469, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849, 374 P.2d 817 (1962).
76 E.g., Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964); Roach v. Harper,
143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958); McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60
Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939).
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seizure had taken place entitling plaintiff to recovery in tort or under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The subsequent decision in United States u. White' does not allow this
conclusion. If White had no "justifiable and constitutionally protected expectation that"78 Jackson would not relate their conversation to the police, then
neither did Dietemann. Similarly, White's constitutional right of privacy was
not violated when, instead of telling the police, Jackson transmitted the conversation,"9 and neither was Dietemann's constitutional privacy invaded when the
defendant's employees transmitted his conversation.
This is not to say that there cannot be a different, stricter standard of conduct set by the state for the protection of privacy than is required by the Constitution. As the Supreme Court noted in Katz:
[T]he protection of a person's general right to privacy-his right to be let
alone by other people-is, like the protection of his property and of his
very life, left largely to the law of the individual States. 0
As was mentioned above, the type of consent given by Dietemann, involving
deceit and subterfuge, is not accepted as effective in tort law. The offensive
conduct in Dietemann was not only the eavesdropping and photography but the
invasion of the privacy of the defendant's home by means of a subterfuge. As
in the De May case, the plaintiff would never have consented to this intrusion
had he known the true identity of the intruders. Following this reasoning, the
circuit court ruled that Dietemann had not taken the risk that what was heard
and seen would be transmitted and photographed. 8
However, the opinion of the circuit court fails to delineate a workable standard. In the district court, the defendant, supposing that a legal search and
seizure had been conducted, claimed that its employees were acting as law enforcement agents. On appeal, after the district court had ruled the search illegal,
the circuit court made no new findings of fact but accepted the disclaimer on the
grounds that it would be unnecessary to reach the issue of Dietemann's constitutional right of privacy. But it was necessary to decide liability as agents of
the police even though the constitutional issue was not reached. With no factual
basis for denying the agency, one might assume from the opinion of the circuit
court that, while defendant's employees could not act independently, they could
if they first made an agreement with the police.
While the constitutional protection afforded one's right of privacy is applied
to prevent intrusions by the state or by individuals acting under color of law
and not against private actions, this distinction need not and should not be made
when dealing with an action for tortious invasion of privacy. Nor should the
scope of one's right of privacy be defined differently depending on the identity
of the intruder. The limitations on the constitutional right of privacy both as to
its scope and those whose conduct it controls should have no effect on the ap77
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plication of the state law for tortious invasions of privacy. In a time when
technological advancements are stripping man's privacy from him, population
and industrial expansions are destroying his seclusion, his misplaced trust can lead
to the transmission of his private conversations, and the press can make a public
figure of the recluse, the tort of unreasonable intrusion may be the last effective
weapon in his fight for privacy. Were its effectiveness to be diluted by using a
different standard for police officers than for private citizens, this weapon might
be rendered useless.
Harry S. Raleigh, Jr.

